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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
BILLIE GUYMON NEWSOM, RICHARD 
MCKEAN NEWSOM, STACY NEWSOM 
KLEIN and TEDDY MAURINE NEWSOM, 
as heirs of TED NEWSOM, 
deceased, 
Plaintiffs-Appellants, 
vs. 
GOLD CROSS SERVICE, INC., d/b/a 
GOLD CROSS AMBULANCE, and GOLD 
CROSS AMBULANCE SERVICE, 
Defendants-Respondents. 
DC C84-6827 
CA 880051-CA 
[Priority 14(b)] 
RESPONDENTS' BRIEF 
JURISDICTION OF THIS COURT AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
This Court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant 
to the Order dated January 15, 1988, of the Utah Supreme Court, 
and also pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(h) (1987). 
The judgment appealed from is a Final Order of Judge John A. 
Rokich after a trial by jury in the Third Judicial District 
Court. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUE PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
The only issue on appeal is whether the Trial Court 
acted properly in giving Jury Instruction No. 2 0 relating to 
the issue of causation. 
STATEMENT AND NATURE OF THE CASE 
Appellants', heirs of Ted Newsom, (hereinafter 
"appellants" or "Newsoms") theory and argument at trial was 
that as a result of the negligence of Gold Cross Ambulance 
(hereinafter "respondents" or "Gold Cross") and its 
employees, the arrival of an ambulance at the scene was 
delayed; thus depriving Mr. Newsom, the deceased, from 
earlier medical care. Newsoms attempted to persuade the jury 
that during the time of the delay Mr. Newsom aspirated 
material into his lungs causing him to go into respiratory 
arrest and eventually cardiac arrest. It was based upon that 
theory that Newsoms1 experts testified that had Mr. Newsom 
been transported earlier to the nearest hospital that he may 
have survived the episode. However, the first arriving 
certified EMT on the scene was an ambulance driver for 
Midvale Ambulance Company by the name of Kevin Ray. Mr. Ray 
testified that upon arrival at the scene Mr. Newsom had not 
vomited, nor was their any indication that he had aspirated 
material into his lungs. Mr. Ray testified that it was minutes 
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after his arrival that Mr. Newsom vomited which required a 
clearing of his air way and aspiration of material. It was 
subsequent to that event that Mr. Newsom went into 
respiratory arrest and cardiac arrest. 
Based upon the factual information provided by Mr. 
Kevin Ray, all of the experts in the case, including Newsoms1 
expert, agreed that Mr. Newsom's chances of survival were in 
no way dependent upon earlier advanced life support inasmuch as 
at the time he vomited, aspirated material and went into 
respiratory arrest advanced life support was available at a 
level equal to that of the emergency room setting of a 
hospital. 
Newsoms advanced numerous theories of negligence 
against Gold Cross. The jury concluded that Gold Cross 
Ambulance was in some way negligent but that negligence was not 
a causative or contributory factor of Mr. Newsom's death. 
The jury was not asked to delineate on the special verdict in 
what way they believed Gold Cross was negligent. 
Ample evidence was available for the jury, based upon 
the testimony of not only Gold Cross' experts but also Newsoms' 
expert, that Mr. Newsom's death resulted from a condition 
which created the primary event and that it was more-likely 
than not that Mr. Newsom would have died even if the entire 
circumstance had taken place in the emergency room of a 
hospital. 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
I. Facts Relating to Sequence of Events, 
Gold Cross Ambulance was called by the 911 Salt Lake 
City fire dispatcher to provide assistance to a fall victim, 
the decedent Ted Newsom. Respondent dispatcher dispatched 
an ambulance to the scene but the Midvale police dispatcher 
cancelled respondent ten minutes after the initial call was 
placed to respond by "911" fire dispatcher. At 4:00 p.m., on 
the same date, the fire dispatcher contacted the Gold Cross 
Ambulance dispatcher. (Clerk's Record Index ["R."] 12 6) 
Between 4:00 p.m. and 4:05 p.m., the Gold Cross Ambulance 
dispatcher paged its nearest ambulance to the Sugar Street Cafe 
four different times. The Gold Cross Ambulance dispatcher 
stated that the nearest Gold Cross ambulance was not answering 
the page. (R. 128.) At 4:05 p.m., the Gold Cross Ambulance 
dispatcher dispatched a second ambulance, located at the Holy 
Cross Jordan Valley Hospital, to the Sugar Street Cafe. Upon 
dispatching the second ambulance, the Gold Cross Ambulance 
dispatcher discontinued trying to contact the nearest 
ambulance. At 4:10 p.m., the Midvale police dispatcher 
cancelled the Gold Cross Ambulance because a Midvale ambulance 
was en route. (R. 129.) Before 4:17 p.m. and 4:18 p.m., the 
Midvale ambulance arrived at the Sugar Street Cafe. At 4:39 
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p.m., the Midvale ambulance transported the deceased to 
Cottonwood Hospital. (R. 130.) 
II. Facts Regarding Issue of Causation. 
Kevin Ray, the ambulance driver on the Midvale 
Ambulance, testified that when he arrived at the scene the 
decedent was breathing, although labored, his skin color was 
normal, he had a pulse and there was nothing in the form of 
vomitus material or bile coming from the mouth or the nose. 
(R. 659 pp. 46-49; attached as Appendix A.) Kevin Ray 
further testified that after having obtained vital signs on the 
decedent, decedent went into respiratory arrest and then for 
the first time vomited. (R. 659 p. 47; attached as Appendix 
A.) 
Central to Newsoms' expert, Dr. Yanowitz's opinion 
in this case is his assumption that the decedent aspirated 
vomitus material prior to advance life support care. In fact 
Dr. Yanowitz believed that this aspiration of vomitus 
material precipitated the decedent's cardiac arrest. (R. 658 
p. 37; attached as Exhibit B.) Newsoms" theory of the case 
against Gold Cross was that Gold Cross delayed in arriving at 
the scene and thus delayed the decedent Mr. Newsom's 
transport to advanced life support care. 
However, Dr. Yanowitz agreed that if in fact the 
testimony of Kevin Ray was accurate, Mr. Newsom would not 
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have survived under the circumstances. (R. 658 pp. 3 0-41; 
attached as Appendix B.) 
Dr. Joseph Perry, a cardiologist and Gold Cross1 
expert, testified that in his opinion the decedent suffered 
from a stroke and accordingly the primary event of a stroke was 
the determinative factor that lead to Mr. Newsom's death and 
not the lack of timely care. Dr. Perry testified that the 
decedent's condition would have been the same whether treated 
in the field or treated in the emergency room of a hospital (R. 
658 pp. 54-58; attached as Appendix C.) 
Dr. Perry testified based upon the EKG tapes and 
the testimony of Kevin Ray, the ambulance driver, Mr. 
Newsom had a very small chance of survival under any 
circumstances (R. 658 pp. 64-67; attached as Appendix D.) 
Dr. Jeff Clawson, physician and noted authority in 
emergency medical services in Utah and elsewhere, testified 
that all of the evidence suggested Mr. Newsom suffered from a 
stroke as the primary event causing his collapse in the Sugar 
Street Cafe, and the results would have been the same had Mr. 
Newsom suffered the primary event, the stroke, in the 
emergency room of a hospital. (R. 658 pp. 129-135; attached 
as Appendix E.) Dr. Clawson further testified that based 
upon the decedent's lack of pulse and his condition as observed 
by Kevin Ray upon his arrival with the Midvale Ambulance, 
earlier transport to a hospital or earlier advanced health care 
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would have not changed the outcome in this case (R. 658 pp. 
129-135; attached as Appendix E.) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
It is the law in the State of Utah that a plaintiff 
is required to prove by the applicable standards of proof 
that the defendant was not only negligent but that any damage 
sustained was to a degree of probability due to the negligence 
of the defendant. Any standard of proof less than probability 
in establishing causation would allow verdicts to be based upon 
speculation and conjecture. Newsoms recognized the accepted 
law and offered to the court jury instructions espousing the 
same principles requiring proof to a degree of probability 
rather than conjecture or speculation. 
On appeal Newsoms wish to introduce a new cause of 
action that was neither raised in the pleadings nor in the jury 
instructions requested by the appellant. Further, the cause of 
action of "loss of chance of survival" is without legal support 
in Utah even if properly plead and introduced at trial. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE JURY WAS APPROPRIATELY INSTRUCTED 
BY THE COURT ON THE LAW RELATING 
TO PROXIMATE CAUSE 
The suggestion that Instruction No. 20 is not the 
applicable law on the issue of proximate cause is completely 
erroneous. The Utah Court of Appeals has recently determined 
in the case of Robinson v. Intermountain Health Care, 740 
P.2d 262 (Utah App. 1987) that an evidentiary basis must 
exist for a jury to conclude that a result is more probably 
than not due to the negligence of the attending physician for 
the plaintiff to recover. Id. at 265. The Court of Appeals 
cites with approval the case of Nixdorf v. Hicken, 612 
P.2d 348 (Utah 1980) and incorporates the Utah Supreme Court's 
language in discussing the preliminary foundation necessary for 
showing a medical malpractice action as follows: 
Generally, this requires the introduction 
of expert medical testimony to establish 
the outcome is more likely the result of 
negligence than some other cause. This 
testimony would be necessary to provide the 
evidentiary basis from which the jury could 
conclude the result is more probable than 
not due to the negligence of the attending 
physician. 
Id. at 353. 
It is important to note that in Robinson, the 
District Court entered summary judgment for defendants because 
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plaintiffs were not able to provide expert testimony 
contradicting defendant's expert testimony that non-negligent 
causes of plaintiff's injury were probable. The Court 
determined that a genuine factual dispute did not arise until 
plaintiff was able to provide expert testimony to the effect 
that plaintiff's injury most likely resulted from negligence. 
Id. at 267. In the case at bar, as in Robinson, the jury, 
having heard the factual dispute with regard to negligence and 
proximate cause, determined that the expert testimony did not 
preponderate in favor of the claim that Mr. Newsom's death 
resulted from the negligence of respondent. Without 
establishing that such negligence probably caused 
Mr. Newsom's death, the question of damages need not be 
considered by the jury. 
The fact that Instruction No. 20 is appropriate under 
Utah law is further highlighted by the case of Marsh v. 
Pemberton, 10 Utah 2d 40, 347 P.2d 1108 (Utah 1959). 
Marsh involves a medical malpractice action against a doctor 
for alleged improper casting procedures on a patient's foot. 
The court determined that an adverse result of treatment for a 
patient does not create a presumption of negligence for the 
physician or surgeon and stated with approval, the following: 
In order to recover in such case the 
plaintiff must show that in treatment of 
the patient the defendant physician did not 
exercise such care and diligence as is 
ordinarily exercised by skilled physicians 
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doing the same type of work in the 
vicinity, and that the want or failure of 
the required skill and care was the cause 
of the injury complained of. That there 
might have been neglect or lack of skill is 
not enough. To permit a cause to go to the 
jury on testimony showing only possibility, 
or what might or could have happened, is to 
permit a jury to base a verdict upon 
conjecture, speculation or suspicion. 
Id. at 1110. Thus, the court in Marsh stated that 
possibility is not sufficient to prove cause and that a verdict 
cannot be based on conjecture, speculation or suspicion. 
Newsoms1 own proposed Jury Instruction No. 10 states in 
pertinent part that "the law does not permit you to base a 
verdict on speculation or conjecture as to the cause of the 
incident in question." (R. 575.) By including this language 
in Newsoms1 own jury instruction, Newsoms acknowledge that such 
speculation and conjecture which would create only a 
possibility of proximate causation is not sufficient for the 
jury to render a verdict in Newsoms1 favor. 
The instructions Newsoms offered dealing with 
proximate cause were accepted verbatim or in substance by the 
trial court. The Wyoming Supreme Court in Bagley v. Watson, 
478 P.2d 595 (Wyo. 1971) determined that where a party's 
proffered instruction is in substance and meaning the same 
theory as the instruction given by the court, that party is 
without standing to assert the giving of the instruction was 
error. Id. at 597-98. 
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The rationale in Bagley is important to our case 
inasmuch as Newsoms1 proposed jury instructions offer in 
substance the same theory of law as now being challenged by 
Newsoms on appeal. Newsoms1 proposed Jury Instruction No. 20 
stated as follows: 
In order to find the defendant Gold Cross 
Ambulance liable for damages, if any, 
sustained by the Plaintiffs, you must find 
that both of the following propositions are 
true: 
1. That Gold Cross Ambulance was 
"negligent" as defined in these 
Instructions. 
2. That the "negligence" of Gold 
Cross Ambulance was the "proximate 
cause" of the death of Ted Newsom 
as defined in these Instructions. 
(R. 585.) Thus, in Newsoms' own Jury Instruction No. 20, 
Newsoms state that before the question of damages can be 
addressed, not only must respondent be found negligent, but 
that negligence must be determined the "proximate cause" of the 
death of Ted Newsom. The Instruction says nothing of Gold 
Cross' negligence being the proximate cause of the "loss of 
chance of survival" for Mr. Newsom. 
In addition, Newsoms' proposed Jury Instruction No. 
23 provides a definition for proximate cause which reads as 
follows: 
The proximate cause of an injury is that 
cause which, in natural and continuous 
sequence, produces the injury, and without 
which the result would not have occurred. 
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It is the efficient cause — the one that 
necessarily sets in operation the factors 
that accomplish the injury. 
(R. 588.) The above-referenced jury instruction was in fact 
the exact instruction given to the jury in this particular 
case. (R. 494.) The Newsoms also proposed a jury instruction 
dealing with the burden of proof being sustained by a 
preponderance of the evidence. This jury instruction was 
adopted verbatim by the court as Jury Instruction No. 9 (R. 
487) and reads as follows: 
The party upon whom the burden of proof 
rests must sustain it by a preponderance of 
the evidence. The law does not permit you 
to base a verdict on speculation or 
conjecture as to the cause of the incident 
in question. If the evidence does not 
preponderate in favor of the party making 
the charge of negligence, then he has 
failed to fulfill his burden of proof and a 
finding must be against that party on that 
issue. In other words, if after 
considering all of the evidence, it should 
appear to you just as probable that the 
defendant was not negligent as that he was, 
or that his negligence, if any, was not a 
proximate cause of the incident as that it 
was such a proximate cause, then a case has 
not been established against him by a 
preponderance of the evidence as the law 
requires and he cannot be held liable. 
(Emphasis added.) 
(R. 575.) 
From the above jury instructions, it is clear that 
Newsoms1 own proposed jury instructions are in complete harmony 
with Jury Instruction No. 2 0 now being challenged by Newsoms on 
appeal. Their own proposed jury instructions dealt with the 
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burden of proof and preponderance of the evidence. These 
instructions stated that if a jury considers it just as 
probable that the defendant was not a proximate cause of the 
incident as that it was such a proximate cause, then a case 
cannot be established against them by a preponderance of the 
evidence as the law requires and they cannot be held liable. 
POINT II 
APPELLANTS RAISE A NEW CAUSE 
OF ACTION ON APPEAL 
Newsoms argument on appeal in essence asks the Court 
to recognize a new cause of action for "the loss of chance 
of survival" of less than fifty percent (50%) on the part of 
the decedent. (See appellants1 Brief at p. 9) Newsoms 
suggestion that the trial court should have allowed the jury to 
determine the loss of chance of survival for Mr. Newsom is 
precluded by the fact that no loss of chance of survival 
instruction was ever proffered at the trial court. Utah law is 
clear in allowing a party to have the jury instructed on its 
theory of the case. Jorgensen v. Issa, 739 P.2d 80, 82 
(Utah App. 1987); Gilhespie v. DeJongf 520 P.2d 878, 
880 (Utah 1974); Stratton v. Nielsen, 25 Utah 2d 124, 477 
————————______———-___—— ^ 
P.2d 152, 153 (Utah 1970). However, a review of Newsoms 
proposed jury instructions will reveal that nowhere in those 
instructions was a theory of loss of chance of survival 
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presented to the trial court. (R. 564-589) For the Newsoms 
now to ask the Court to recognize a new cause of action under a 
theory never pled in appellants' Amended Complaint or in any of 
Newsoms proposed jury instructions is clearly improper. 
Additionally, even if Newsoms made a claim for "loss of chance 
of survival," no authority exists in Utah to grant relief for 
such a claim. 
The Utah Supreme Court has previously determined that 
an issue not raised at the trial court cannot later be raised 
for the first time on appeal. In Nelson v. Newman, 583 
P.2d 601 (Utah 1978) the plaintiff alleged error by the trial 
court for not submitting to the jury the question of whether 
admitted breaches of contract on the part of defendant were 
material and substantial so as to justify non-performance by 
plaintiff. Plaintiff prayed for judgment that the subject 
contract was valid and enforceable, and did not pray for 
rescission of the contract. The court determined that "as 
plaintiff did not raise this issue of rescission below he 
cannot raise it for the first time on appeal". Id. at 603. 
Thus Utah law will not allow Newsoms to ask for damages due to 
the negligence proximately caused by Gold Cross and then after 
receiving an unfavorable ruling with regard to that prayer, ask 
on appeal for damages as a result of decedent's loss of chance 
of survival. 
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Newsoms cite in their brief an article from the Yale 
Law Journal entitled "Causation, Valuation, and Chance in 
Personal Injury Torts Involving Pre-Existing Conditions and 
Future Consequences," 90 Yale L. J,, 1353 (1981). Professor 
Joseph H. King, Jr., the author of this article, acknowledges 
that the traditional rule with regard to proximate cause is: 
"[u]nless a causal connection is established under the 
applicable standard of proof (usually requiring that it appear 
more likely than not), the plaintiff will receive nothing for 
the loss in question". Id. at 1356. Professor King goes on 
to state that 
a plaintiff ordinarily should be required 
to prove by the applicable standard of 
proof that the defendant caused the loss in 
question. What caused a loss, however, 
should be a separate question from what the 
nature and extent of the loss are. 
Id. at 1363. The above quotations clearly indicate that even 
Professor King acknowledges the standard of proof for proving 
causation is a completely and distinctly separate question from 
the standard of proof for proving the nature and extent of 
damages. In the case at bar, the jury determined that the 
Newsoms failed to establish by the applicable standard of proof 
that the respondent caused or contributed to the death of 
Mr. Newsom. Therefore, the nature and extent of any damages 
suffered by Newsoms as a result of the death of Mr. Newsom 
were not addressed by the jury. 
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Newsoms cite the case of Brown v. Johnson, 24 Utah 
2d 388, 472 P.2d 942 (Utah 1970) as the dispositive case in 
Utah on the issue of "loss of chance of survival" due to 
negligence. Brown v. Johnson makes no mention whatsoever of 
any cause of action for "loss of chance of survival." The 
Brown case deals only with the issue of damages and not 
causation. In Brown, the facts were essentially not in 
dispute. The defendant was following plaintiff down a canyon 
road on a wintery day awaiting an opportunity to pass the 
plaintiff. The plaintiff slowed his car and was struck in the 
rear end by defendant's vehicle. The plaintiff prevailed in a 
second trial and defendant attempted to assign error to the 
trial court for refusing to instruct the jury that nothing 
could be awarded for possible future surgery. The issue of 
liability having already been established, the jury determined 
that plaintiff should be compensated for a fifteen (15%) 
percent chance of possible future surgery. The court 
determined that this fifteen percent chance of possible future 
surgery was established by a preponderance of the evidence and 
therefore was recoverable by plaintiff. 
The decision in Brown is in no way contradictory to 
Jury Instruction No. 20 given in the instant case. Jury 
Instruction No. 20 dealt specifically with the issue of 
liability and not with the amount of damages. The rationale in 
the Brown case is sound inasmuch as after the proximate cause 
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issue is established, the jury is allowed to compensate 
plaintiff for any damages proximately caused by defendant's 
negligence. To rule otherwise, would require a plaintiff who 
was clearly injured as a proximate result of a defendant's 
actions, to wait an indeterminate amount of time before 
bringing a lawsuit against the defendant in order for injuries 
to fully manifest themselves. 
CONCLUSION 
Appellants can only prevail on appeal if this Court 
is willing to abandon accepted and traditional rules 
governing the finding of proximate cause for an injury or 
death. Newsoms would have the court adopt a rule allowing them 
to prevail when the best evidence they can muster is that the 
negligence of Gold Cross may have or possibly could have 
caused or contributed to the injury or death of Mr. Newsom. 
That test would allow the jury to speculate and rely upon 
conjecture in establishing fundamental elements of liability. 
In addition, Newsoms, in an effort to avoid the 
results of a fair trial, attempt an end run on the issue of 
proximate cause by claiming now what they really wanted was an 
award of damages for the "loss of chance of survival.4* 
Interestingly such a contention is found nowhere within any of 
Newsoms pleadings in this case prior to appeal or in any of 
their proposed jury instructions at the time of trial. In 
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fact, Newsoms own proposed jury instructions in substance 
outlined the law as given in Instruction No. 20 which they 
claim to be in error. Newsoms accordingly recognized that the 
great weight of evidence in this case preponderated in the 
favor of Gold Cross and that there was no causal relationship 
between claimed negligent acts of Gold Cross and the death of 
Mr. Newsom. For Newsoms to raise on appeal, for the first 
time, a suggestion of entitlement to relief under the theory of 
a new cause of action is clearly untimely. 
Respondent respectfully requests this court to affirm 
the judgment of the court below. 
DATED this /ffi^day of /fufl/^f 1988. 
RICHARDS, BRANDT, MILLER 
& NELSON 
res 
Lloyd A. Hardcastle 
Attorney for Respondents 
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I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing instrument was mailed J.irst class, postage prepaid 
on this /#** day of /Qi^f {/-£< 1988, to the following 
counsel df record: / 
James W. McConkie, Esq. 
PARKER, McKEOWN & McCONKIE 
505 East 200 South 
Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, UT 84102 
NEWS2/LHW 
jb8128 
6014-095 
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ADDENDUM 

COTTONWOOD HOSPITAL WHERE THEY RESPOND OUT OF? 
A YES. 
Q AND THEY'RE QUITE A WAYS AWAY, AND SO YOU'RE 
CLOSE AND GENERALLY YOU HAVE FOUR OR FIVE MINUTES OR 
SO WITH A PATIENT, SO YOU CAN BE GATHERING THESE VITAL 
SIGNS AND STUFF TO GIVE THEM ON THEIR ARRIVAL SO THEY 
CAN HANDLE THEIR ADVANCED LIFE SUPPORT FUNCTION? 
A THAT'S RIGHT. 
Q SO, YOU ARRIVED ON THE SCENE, YOU KNOW RESCUE 
66 IS ON ITS WAY; AND YOU GET A PULSE; YOU SEE THAT THE 
PATIENT IS INDEED BREATHING, ALTHOUGH LABORED; THE SKIN 
COLOR IS NORMAL, AND AT THAT POINT, AS I UNDERSTAND 
YOUR TESTIMONY, AT THAT POINT WHEN YOU WERE TAKING 
PULSE AND THAT KIND OF THING IS NOT WHEN YOU BEGIN TO 
NOTICE THE VOMIT, AS I UNDERSTOOD AND WROTE DOWN. AFTER 
YOU MADE THOSE OBSERVATIONS THEN THE RATE STARTED TO 
COME BACK, BUT WHEN YOU ARRIVED THERE WAS NOTHING COMING 
OUT OF THE MOUTH OR NOSE; IS THAT CORRECT? 
A NOT THAT I NOTICED. 
Q AND THEN WENT INTO RESPIRATORY ARREST; IS THAT 
CORRECT? 
A YES. 
Q AND IS THAT WHEN YOU NOTICED -- AFTER THAT POINT 
YOU NOTICED THAT HE HAD THIS VOMIT COMING OUT, OR THAT 
YOU NOTICED THAT IT WAS IN HIS MOUTH? 
APPENDIX A 
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A YES. 
Q AS A MATTER OF FACT, AS I REVIEWED YOUR 
DEPOSITION, IT WAS YOU THAT WERE MONITORING THE 
RESPIRATION AND IT WAS YOU THAT DETERMINED THAT HE HAD 
GONE INTO RESPIRATORY ARREST AS OPPOSED TO THE 
PARAMEDICS? 
A YES, I DID. 
Q AND YOU REPORTED THAT TO THEM, THAT HE HAD 
QUIT RESPIRATION? 
A IMMEDIATELY. 
Q AND IT WAS AT THAT TIME WHEN YOU NOTICED THAT 
HE ARRESTED? THAT IS THE POINT THAT YOU STARTED TO 
VENTILATE? 
A YES, IT WAS. 
Q YOU HADN'T AT ANY TIME PRIOR TO THAT POINT 
STARTED TO VENTILATE? 
A NO. 
Q I ASSUME THEN THAT THE FACT THAT YOU DID NOT 
START TO VENTILATE AT ANY TIME PRIOR TO THAT TIME IT 
WAS YOUR OPINION, BASED ON WHAT YOU WERE SEEING AND 
OBSERVING, THAT HE HAD AN ADEQUATE AIRWAY? 
MR. MCCONKIE: OBJECTION, YOUR HONOR. LEADING. 
MR. HAYES: THIS IS CROSS-EXAMINATION. IT'S 
HIS WITNESS. 
MR. MCCONKIE: SUGGESTING AN ANSWER, YOUR HONOR. 
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IT'S ALSO SUGGESTING AN ANSWER AND I THINK I DON'T MIND 
IF HE --
THE COURT: YOU CAN REPHRASE THE QUESTION AND 
GET THE SAME ANSWER. 
MR. HAYES: I THINK, YOUR HONOR, I'M ENTITLED 
TO BROAD LATITUDE ON CROSS-EXAMINATION. 
THE COURT: RIGHT, YOU ARE. 
MR. HAYES: LET ME TRY IT A DIFFERENT WAY. 
Q (.BY MR. HAYES) UP TO THE POINT THAT MR. NEWSOM, 
THE VICTIM, ARRESTED AND THEN HAD WHAT YOU OBSERVED AS 
VOMIT IN HIS MOUTH, UP TO THAT POINT I'M ASSUMING THAT 
BECAUSE YOU DID NOT ATTEMPT TO VENTILATE HIM THAT IT WAS 
YOUR OPINION HE HAD ADEQUATE AIRWAY? 
A AT THAT TIME, YES, HE WOULD HAVE TO SURVIVE, YES. 
Q IF YOU HAD ANY DOUBTS IN YOUR MIND THAT HE HAD 
ADEQUATE AIRWAY WHEN YOU WERE DOING THE REST OF THIS, 
YOU WOULD HAVE DONE SOMETHING ABOUT IT AT THAT POINT; ISN'T 
THAT TRUE? 
A YES, I WOULD HAVE. 
Q THAT IS YOUR TRAINING? 
A YES. 
Q OKAY. NOW, IT IS MY UNDERSTANDING THAT THE 
RESPIRATORY ARREST OCCURRED APPROXIMATELY TWO MINUTES 
AFTER YOUR ARRIVAL. 
A AFTER THE PARAMEDICS' ARRIVAL. 
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Q OKAY. AND THE CARDIAC ARREST THAT FOLLOWED 
THAT WAS ABOUT A MINUTE AFTER THAT? 
A I'D SAY IN THE AREA. IN THE EXCITEMENT IT'S 
HARD TO TELL, BUT I WOULD SAY APPROXIMATELY. 
Q AND SO AT THE TIME OF THE RESPIRATORY ARREST 
AND CARDIAC ARREST, BOTH YOURSELVES AND THE PARAMEDICS 
WERE ON THE SCENE? 
A YES. 
Q AT THE TIME RIGHT FOLLOWING THE FULL ARREST 
YOU WENT INTO THE PROCEDURES, AND I MENTIONED THE 
VENTILATION, BUT YOU ALSO INTUBATED HIM AT THE SAME TIME; 
IS THAT CORRECT? 
A I DID NOT. THE PARAMEDICS DID. 
Q YOU DON'T REMEMBER EVER ESTABLISHING A PULSE 
OR RESPIRATION FOLLOWING THE ARREST, DO YOU? 
A NO, NOT THAT I RECALL. 
Q NOW, I TAKE IT FROM YOUR TESTIMONY IN THIS CASE 
THAT IT WAS IMPORTANT TO YOU TO MAKE SURE BEFORE 
TRANSPORTING THIS PATIENT THAT THE CONDITION WAS 
STABILIZED; IS THAT RIGHT? 
A STABILIZED AS MUCH AS POSSIBLE. 
Q AND EVEN THOUGH YOU HAD NOT OBTAINED PULSE AND 
RESPIRATION AT THE TIME THAT HE WAS TRANSPORTED, IT WAS, 
I GUESS, YOUR DETERMINATION, AND THE PARAMEDICS' 
DETERMINATION THAT THERE WAS NO FURTHER HELP THEY COULD 
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Q WOULD YOU EXPECT OR ANTICIPATE, DOCTOR, THAT 
AFTER THE PATIENT, MR. NEWSOM, ASPIRATED AND I MEAN 
ASPIRATED MATERIAL INTO HIS LUNG, THAT HIS BREATHING 
WOULD IMPROVE? 
A AFTER HE ASPIRATED? 
Q AFTER HE ASPIRATED. 
A YOU KNOW, IT'S HARD TO -- YOU KNOW, I WOULD 
NOT EXPECT IT TO IMPROVE A GREAT DEAL. 
0 OFFICER HODGKINSON TOLD US THAT WHEN HE TURNED 
HIM OVER ONTO HIS SIDE AND DESCRIBED THE ASPIRATION AND 
THEN TURNED HIM OVER ON HIS SIDE THAT HIS BREATHING 
IMPROVED. 
A IT MIGHT INITIALLY HAVE CLEARED HIS AIRWAY TO 
SOME EXTENT, ALTHOUGH THE INITIAL ASPIRATION IS STILL 
GOING TO HAVE ITS EFFECT ON THE LUNGS. 
Q OKAY. LET'S PUT IN ANOTHER FACTOR IN THIS CASE, 
DOCTOR. WOULD IT CHANGE YOUR OPINION IN THIS CASE IF YOU 
WERE TOLD THAT THE ARRIVING EMT ON THE AMBULANCE ARRIVED, 
FOUND NO INDICATION OF ASPIRATION AT THIS POINT AND FOUND 
NOTHING TO INDICATE TO HIM THAT THIS PERSON WAS IN NEED 
OF ANY SUCTIONING, THAT HE WENT TO FINDING OUT VITAL 
SIGNS, AND AT THAT POINT HE FOUND A HEART RATE OF 100 
AND WITH NO INDICATIONS OF THE PATIENT BEING CYANOTIC --
THE COLOR OF THE PATIENT WAS NORMAL -- THAT THEY WERE 
MONITORING HIS RESPIRATIONS WHILE THE PARAMEDICS WERE 
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COMING, THAT HE FOUND — AND BASED ON HIS EMERGENCY MEDICAL 
TRAINING HE FOUND NO REASON IN THE WORLD TO BELIEVE THAT 
THIS PERSON HAD ANY AIRWAY DIFFICULTY, THAT WHILE THE 
PARAMEDICS WERE THERE AND HE WAS THE ONE MONITORING THE 
RESPIRATIONS THAT MR. NEWSOM ARRESTED, WENT INTO 
RESPIRATORY ARREST, HE STOPPED BREATHING AND THAT AT A 
POINT HE VOMITED AND AT A POINT THE EMT REALIZED THAT HIS 
MOUTH AT THAT POINT WAS FULL OF VOMIT AND HE WAS ASPIRATING 
IT WAS AT THAT POINT THAT THEY INTUBATED HIM, BEGAN TO 
USE SUCTION AND VENTILATE. 
NOW, IF THAT'S THE FACT SCENARIO, AND I ASK YOU 
FOR A MINUTE TO ACCEPT THAT AS THE FACT SCENARIO, AS 
OPPOSED TO THE HODGKINSON SCENARIO, DOES THAT CHANGE ANY 
OPINION YOU HAVE IN THIS CASE? 
A WELL, I BELIEVE, THEN, THAT THIS PARTICULAR 
SCENARIO, HE PROBABLY WOULD NOT HAVE SURVIVED UNDER THOSE 
CIRCUMSTANCES BECAUSE THE MEDICAL, APPROPRIATE MEDICAL 
THERAPY WAS GIVEN. 
Q OKAY. TURN TO -- THESE AREN'T NUMBERED AND I 
MAY JUST HAVE TO FIND IT REAL QUICK AND FIND IT FOR YOU. 
DO YOU REMEMBER READING AN INCIDENT REPORT FROM AN OFFICER 
BY THF NAME OF TONY MASON? 
A OFFHAND I REMEMBER THE NAME. I CERTAINLY DON'T 
REMEMBER THE REPORT. 
0 BECAUSE WE DON'T HAVE IT NUMBERED, I'M GOING TO 
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HAVE TO FLIP THROUGH HERE AND ASK YOUR TOLERANCE OF ME FOR 
JUST A MINUTE. 
THE COURT: WELL, JURORS, DO YOU WANT TO STAND 
FOR A SECOND WHILE WE'RE GOING THROUGH THIS? 
Q (BY MR. HAYES) DOCTOR, LOOKING TO THE MATERIAL 
ATTACHED TO THE BACK, YOU WILL SEE THE ARTICLE THAT YOU 
REFERRED TO AND -- THAT WAS A 1975 ARTICLE; ISN'T THAT 
RIGHT? 
A YES. 
Q IS IT YOUR UNDERSTANDING THAT THAT, IN '84 WAS 
THE -- CONSIDERED TO BE WHAT WAS DONE IN '75 WAS CURRENT 
AND ON THE CUTTING EDGE OF WHAT WAS HAPPENING IN EMERGENCY 
MEDICAL TREATMENT? 
A YEAH, I BELIEVE SO. 
Q AFTER THAT YOU WILL FIND THE TRANSCRIPT BETWEEN 
DR. MCCAA AND PARAMEDICS AND A LETTER FROM MR. MC CONKIE 
TO --
A WHERE ARE WE NOW? 
MR. HAYES: MAY I APPROACH THE WITNESS, YOUR 
HONOR? 
THE COURT: YOU MAY. 
MR. HAYES: I CAN DO THIS A LITTLE FASTER. 
Q (BY MR. HAYES) HERE WE ARE. OKAY. BACK UP ONE 
PAGE WITH ME FIRST, DOCTOR. THERE IS A PAGE THERE ENTITLED 
"RELEVANT MEDICAL INFORMATION." 
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A YES. 
Q AND HAS: DR. MCCAA (1) VOMIT UNDER THESE 
3I CIRCUMSTANCES IS COMMON. 
4 I A YES. 
Q THAT'S WHAT THE FIRST ONE SAYS? 
6 I A YES. 
7 J Q DOWN TO NO. 3: PARAMEDICS PUT A TUBE DOWN 
TED'S THROAT-EVIDENCE THAT THERE WAS NO MEAT OR OTHER 
g j FOOD CAUGHT WHICH WOULD HAVE CAUSED SUFFOCATION. DO YOU 
SEE THAT? 
A YES. 
Q THIS IS SOMETHING YOU HAD AS PART OF THE 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 SUMMARY? 
A YES. THAT'S RIGHT. 
Q OKAY. THE NEXT PAGE OVER IS A STATEMENT 
PREPARED BY SERGEANT TONY MASON, AND JUST HALFWAY DOWN 
IT SAYS: MIDVALE FIRE AND SALT LAKE COUNTY PARAMEDICS 
ARRIVED AT THE SAME TIME. THE VICTIM BEGAN TO ASPIRATE 
AND WENT INTO FULL ARREST. 
OKAY. DO YOU REMEMBER READING THAT PART OF 
THIS INFORMATION AND MATERIAL THAT HAD ORIGINALLY BEEN 
22 | GIVEN TO YOU? 
23 , A THAT'S CORRECT 
24 Q YOU REMEMBER READING THAT? 
25 I A YES 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
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Q SO THAT I'M CLEAR, DOCTOR, ON YOUR TESTIMONY 
IN THIS REGARD, IF THE SCENARIO WAS THAT THE ASPIRATION 
TOOK PLACE AFTER THE PARAMEDICS ARRIVED, WHEN THEY WERE 
THERE TO SUCTION, CREATE AN AIRWAY AND THAT TYPE OF THING, 
IF THAT IS THE FACTS IN THIS CASE, WHAT DOES THAT SUGGEST 
TO YOU AS THE CAUSE OF DEATH? 
MR. MC CONKIE: IF I COULD INTERPOSE ONE 
OBJECTION HERE. I DON'T LIKE TO DO THAT ON CROSS, BUT 
I DO CONTEST MR. NELSON'S CHARACTERIZATION THAT THE ONLY 
ASPIRATION THAT TOOK PLACE WAS WHEN THE PARAMEDICS --
THAT'S A MISCHARACTERIZATION OF THE FACTS. 
THE COURT: WELL, THE TWO PARTIES TESTIFIED, 
THREE PARTIES, TESTIFIED AS TO TIME. 
Q (BY MR. HAYES) SO, THE FACTS ARE CONSISTENT. 
THE FACTS I HAVE GIVEN. 
THE COURT: CONSISTENT WITH THE TWO WITNESSES. 
THEREFORE, THE --
MR. HAYES: THE WITNESSES. 
THE COURT: SO, THEREFORE, THE OBJECTION IS 
OVERRULED. 
Q (BY MR. HAYES) WHAT WOULD HAVE BEEN THE CAUSE 
OF DEATH, THEN? I MEAN, EVERYONE'S HEART STOPS, I 
UNDERSTAND THAT, WHEN YOU DIE. 
A STILL — I WOULD STILL THINK THAT THE CAUSE OF 
DEATH WOULD BE DIRECTLY RELATED TO THE CARDIAC AND 
3<+ 
RESPIRATORY DIFFICULTIES ASSOCIATED WITH THE ASPIRATION. 
Q OKAY. BUT IF HE ASPIRATED AFTER HE WENT INTO 
ARREST, DOESN'T THAT BEG THE QUESTION? 
A IT WASN'T PRESENTED THAT HE FIRST WENT INTO 
ARREST -- ARREST AND THEN ASPIRATED. 
Q I'M SORRY. LET ME BACK UP. 
A I DIDN'T GET IT THAT WAY. 
Q OFFICER RAY TESTIFIED THAT WHEN HE ARRIVED ON 
THE SCENE THE MAN HAD SOMEWHERE BETWEEN A STRONG AND A 
WEAK PULSE OF 100, THAT HE WAS UNCONSCIOUS, THAT HE WAS 
NOT CYANOTIC, COLOR WAS NORMAL, THAT THE MAN WAS 
OBVIOUSLY HAVING LABORED BREATHING, THAT WHILE THEY WERE 
THERE THERE WAS NO REASON FOR THEM TO BELIEVE THAT THE 
MAN WAS NOT HAVING A CLEAR AIRWAY, NO REASON TO BELIEVE 
THAT THEY NEEDED TO DO ANY SUCTIONING OF HIS MOUTH OR PUT 
A TUBE DOWN OR ANYTHING, THAT WHILE HE WAS MONITORING 
RESPIRATIONS -- AND THIS PARTICULAR EMT TAKES CREDIT FOR 
SAYING -- I DIDN'T MEAN THAT TO SOUND LIKE HE WAS DOING 
SOMETHING IMPROPER, BUT HE'S THE ONE THAT NOTICED THAT 
RESPIRATION STOPPED AND ALERTED THE PARAMEDICS, SAID HE'S 
IN RESPIRATORY ARREST; ISN'T THAT WHAT IT MEANS? 
A IF THAT'S WHAT IT MEANS? 
Q DOESN'T "RESPIRATORY ARREST" MEAN HE STOPPED 
BREATHING? 
A YES. BUT PEOPLE STOP BREATHING CLEARLY WHEN 
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THEY'RE HAVING IRREGULAR RESPIRATORY PHENOMENON. 
Q BUT THIS STOPPING BREATHING, THOUGH, HAD TO BE 
SOMETHING DIFFERENT THAN HE HAD SEEN DURING THE TWO 
MINUTES BEFORE, THE PERIOD OF TIME HE HAD BEEN MONITORING, 
ABOUT TWO MINUTES. HE SAID HE STOPPED BREATHING. HE 
NOTIFIED THE PARAMEDICS HE'S IN RESPIRATORY ARREST, AND 
AT THAT POINT HE SAYS HE REALIZED THE MAN VOMITED, THAT 
THERE WAS VOMIT IN HIS MOUTH, THAT HE -- AT THAT POINT 
THEY BEGAN, THEY INTUBATED HIM TRYING TO SUCTION IT OUT. 
NOW, I WANT YOU TO ASSUME FOR A MINUTE THAT THAT 
IS THE TIME, THE ONLY TIME, THAT ASPIRATION INTO THE LUNGS 
TOOK PLACE. IF THAT IS THE TIME, THAT CANNOT, THEN, BE, 
ISN'T IT TRUE, THE CAUSE OF THE RESPIRATORY ARREST? 
A IT MIGHT NOT BE. CERTAINLY CANNOT BE, AS YOU 
PRESENT IT. THE ASPIRATION COULD NOT HAVE CAUSED THE 
RESPIRATORY ARREST BECAUSE HE ARRESTED -- HE PUT THAT 
IN QUOTES -- PRIOR TO YOU TELLING ME THAT HE ASPIRATED. 
Q THAT MEANS THAT THERE HAS GOT TO BE SOMETHING 
ELSE GOING ON OTHER THAN THIS VOIDING SYNDROME --
A WELL, HE ALSO HIT HIS HEAD AND COULD HAVE 
SUFFERED A CONCUSSION WHICH COULD HAVE AFFECTED HIS 
VENTILATION AND CAUSED HIS BREATHING TO BE IRREGULAR AND 
PERHAPS EVEN STOP. HE CERTAINLY COULD HAVE HAD At HEAD 
INJURY --
0 AND HE ALSO COULD --
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1 A THAT CAUSED THE RESPIRATORY ARREST. 
2 Q AND HE ALSO COULD HAVE HAD A STROKE? 
3 A CERTAINLY COULD HAVE HAD A STROKE. 
4
 Q AND THAT IS ONE OF THE KNOWN PROBLEMS WITH 
5 HIGH BLOOD PRESSURE, HYPERTENSION, STROKES? 
6 A THAT IS CORRECT. 
7 Q WHAT MADE YOU BELIEVE THIS MAN WASN'T ON 
8 MEDICATION AT THE TIME FOR HIGH BLOOD PRESSURE? 
9 i A I BELIEVE I READ IT IN THE RECORDS SOMEWHERE. 
10 I THINK IN THE EMERGENCY ROOM, WHEN THEY GAVE A BRIEF 
11 SUMMARY OF HIS -- I COULD EVEN FIND THAT FOR YOU BECAUSE 
12 I RECENTLY REVIEWED IT. 
13 Q DOCTOR, JUST SO THAT I'M CLEAR AND WE HAVE A 
14 CLEAR UNDERSTANDING, CENTRAL TO YOUR OPINION IN THIS 
15 CASE IS THAT THE ASPIRATION TOOK PLACE PRIOR TO THE 
16 ADVANCE LIFE SUPPORT PEOPLE BEING ON THE SCENE TO HANDLE 
17 THE PROBLEM? 
18 A YES. 
19 Q AND YOU BELIEVE THAT IS WHAT PRECIPITATED THE 
20 CARDIAC ARREST? 
21 A YES. 
22 Q JUST A COUPLE CLEAN-UP QUESTIONS. ISN'T IT 
23 TRUE, DOCTOR, IN YOUR OPINION A PERSON CAN BE PREVENTED 
24 FROM ASPIRATING BY BEING ROLLED OVER ON THEIR SIDE OR 
25 STOMACH? 
A GENERALLY THAT'S ONE OF THE TECHNIQUES USED. 
Q DOCTOR, IF YOU ASSUME MY SCENARIO THAT I HAVE 
GIVEN YOU BASED ON THE TESTIMONY OF DR. RAY AND TONY 
MASON AS TO THE SEQUENCE OF THE EVENTS, AND ASSUME FOR A 
MINUTE THAT --
THE COURT: YOU HAVE ELEVATED RAY TO A DOCTOR. 
MR. HAYES: DID I SAY "DOCTOR"? 
THE COURT: MR. RAY, THE WITNESS --
Q (BY MR. HAYES) THE EMT RAY. MY STOMACH IS 
RUMBLING IN MY EARS. 
EMT RAY AND SERGEANT MASON, BASED ON THEIR 
SCENARIO OF WHAT HAPPENED, IF WE TAKE THOSE AND ASSUME OR 
CONCLUDE THAT THE ASPIRATION TOOK PLACE AFTER THE 
RESPIRATORY ARREST AND IMMEDIATELY PRIOR TO THE CARDIAC 
ARREST, AND YOU INCLUDE IN THERE THAT THERE ARE ADVANCED 
LIFE SUPPORT PEOPLE ON THE SCENE, THAT THE MAN HAS A HEART 
RATE WHEN THE PARAMEDICS ARRIVE BUT THEY CAN'T OBTAIN A 
PULSE, WHICH I ASSUME IS WHERE WE COME UP WITH ELECTRICAL 
MECHANICAL DISASSOC I AT I ON DIAGNOSIS. DO YOU HAVE AN 
OPINION OF HIS CHANCE OF SURVIVAL UNDER THOSE CIRCUMSTANCES? 
A AT ASPIRATION? 
Q AFTER ASPIRATION. 
A NOT VERY GOOD. 
Q LESS THAN 50 PERCENT? 
A YES. 
38 
MR. HAYES: THAT'S ALL I HAVE. 
REDIRECT EXAMINATION 
BY MR. MC CONKIE: 
Q 
PERIOD OF 
A 
Q 
THE SCENE 
IS IT POSSIBLE TO ASPIRATE MORE THAN ONCE 
TIME? 
YES. 
AND IF I TOLD YOU THE PARAMEDICS WERE NOT 
AT 4:12, THAT THEY ARRIVED LATER, IS IT 
INCONSISTENT WITH WHAT YOU KNOW ABOUT MEDICINE THAT 
COULD HAVE ASPIRATED AT 4:12 AND AGAIN AT 4:17? 
A 
Q 
IS TO GET 
j ASPIRATES 
A 
HE COULD HAVE ASPIRATED AT BOTH TIMES. 
IN A 
ON 
HE 
I TAKE IT THE CRITICAL FOCUS OF YOUR TESTIMONY 
HELP TO THE SCENE QUICKLY SO THAT BEFORE 
SUCTION DEVICES ARE PRESENT? 
HE 
THAT IS CORRECT. I MEAN SOMEBODY THERE WHO IS 
DOWN FOR UNKNOWN REASONS IS ALWAYS A CONCERN, AND 
1 MAINTAINING AN AIRWAY AND PREVENTING ASPIRATION IS 
A CONCERN 
Q 
IN SOMEBODY IN THAT CIRCUMSTANCE. 
ALSO 
WOULD IT HAVE INCREASED MR. NEWSOM'S CHANCES 
FOR SURVIVAL IF HE HAD BEEN ABLE TO ARRIVE AT THE 
EMERGENCY 
AND 8:10? 
SURVIVAL? 
A 
Q 
ROOM AT THE HOSPITAL SOMEWHERE BETWEEN 8: 
WOULD THAT INCREASE MR. NEWSOM'S CHANCES 
PRIOR TO HIS APPARENT ASPIRATION? 
YES. 
06 
FOR 
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HONOR, 
A I BELIEVE SO. 
Q HAS ANYTHING DEFENSE COUNSEL PRESENTED TO YOU 
TODAY CHANGED YOUR OPINION OF THIS CASE, CHANGED YOUR 
VIEW OF THE CASE? IS YOUR OPINION STILL THE SAME? 
A BASED --
Q BASED ON MY REPRESENTATION? 
A BASED ON YOUR REPRESENTATION MY OPINION IS THE 
SAME. 
MR. MC CONKIE: I HAVE NOTHING FURTHER, YOUR 
MR. HAYES: JUST BRIEFLY. 
RECROSS-EXAM INAT I ON 
BY MR. HAYES: 
Q DOCTOR, YOU TESTIFIED THAT IT'S POSSIBLE TO 
ASPIRATE TWICE. WHAT I'M INTERESTED IN IS IF HE HAD 
ASPIRATED AT 12 MINUTES AFTER 4:00, WOULD YOU, UNDER 
THOSE CIRCUMSTANCES EXPECT HIM TO HAVE IMPROVED BREATHING 
FOR APPROXIMATELY 6 OR 7 MINUTES? 
A CERTAINLY THE EFFECTS OF ASPIRATION CAN BE 
VARIABLE, AND DEPENDING ON OTHER CIRCUMSTANCES HE COULD 
HAVE IMPROVED HIS VENTILATOR EFFORTS AND HIS BREATHING 
FOR A PERIOD OF TIME. 
Q WOULD YOU EXPECT, IF THE CIRCUMSTANCES WERE — 
WELL, YOU SAID THAT IF HE HAD BEEN IN THE EMERGENCY ROOM 
BETWEEN THAT PERIOD OF TIME, 4:00, 4:10, WHATEVER, AND 
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HAD BEEN IN THE EMERGENCY ROOM HIS CHANCES OF SURVIVAL 
WOULD HAVE BEEN BETTER; IS THAT RIGHT? 
A ASSUMING HE HAD BEEN IN THE EMERGENCY ROOM 
PRIOR TO THE ASPIRATION. 
Q ARE YOU ATTEMPTING BY THAT TO MAKE A DIFFERENTI-
ATION BETWEEN HAVING ADVANCED LIFE-SUPPORT PEOPLE THERE 
IN THE E.R.? ARE YOU SUGGESTING --
A NO, SIR, NOT NECESSARILY. 
Q THE FACT THAT HE ASPIRATED, UNDER MY SUGGESTION 
TO YOU OF THE FACTS WHILE THE PARAMEDICS ARE THERE, THAT'S 
NO DIFFERENT THAN HIS --
A NO. 
Q -- ASPIRATION IN THE EMERGENCY ROOM, IS IT? 
A THAT'S CORRECT. 
MR. HAYES: THAT'S ALL I HAVE. 
MR. MC CONKIE: DR. YANOWITZ, THANK YOU VERY MUCH. 
I APPRECIATE YOUR TESTIMONY. 
THE COURT: MAY THIS WITNESS BE EXCUSED THEN, 
COUNSEL? 
MR. HAYES: I HAVE NO OBJECTION. 
THE COURT: THIS WOULD BE A GOOD TIME FOR US 
TO RECESS. WE'LL TAKE A RECESS. WHEN DO YOU WANT TO START 
UP AGAIN? WE WILL RETURN AT 1:30. 
REMEMBER THE ADMONISHMENT NOT TO TALK TO EACH 
OTHER OR ANYONE ELSE ABOUT THE CASE, FORM ANY OPINIONS OR 
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SHORTLY AFTER HIS ARRIVAL THE PARAMEDICS 
ARRIVED. UPON THEIR ARRIVAL INFORMATION WAS EXCHANGED 
AND AS MR. RAY MONITORED RESPIRATIONS, MR. NEWSOM WENT 
INTO RESPIRATORY ARREST, QUITTING BREATHING, AND IN THE 
COMPANY OF THE EMT'S AND PARAMEDICS AT THAT TIME VOMITED 
OR -- AND FOR FEAR OF ASPIRATION OF THAT HE WAS SUCTIONED 
AT THAT TIME, INTUBATED, VENTILATION PROCESS WAS 
UNDERTAKEN. 
AT THAT POINT ALSO, OR SHORTLY THEREAFTER WITHIN 
A MINUTE, IT WAS DETERMINED HE WAS IN CARDIAC ARREST. THE 
HEART WENT INTO CARDIAC ARREST, AND THEY THEN BEGAN TO 
PERFORM THE FUNCTIONS AS YOU HAVE SEEN IN THE MATERIALS 
IN REVIEWING THE PARAMEDICS' EXCHANGE FROM THE HOSPITAL, 
I.V.'S AND SO ON AND SO FORTH. 
NOW, DOCTOR, BASED UPON THAT INFORMATION THAT 
I HAVE JUST GIVEN YOU THAT HAS BEEN THE TESTIMONY AS I 
HAVE UNDERSTOOD IT IN THIS CASE, DO YOU HAVE AN OPINION 
IN REGARDS TO WHETHER -- LET'S DO IT THIS WAY. DO YOU HAVE 
AN OPINION REGARDING MR. NEWSOM'S CHANCES OF SURVIVAL? 
WELL, LET'S DO IT FIRST THIS WAY, THE CHANCES OF SURVIVAL 
HAD THE MAN BEEN SEEN BY ADVANCED CARDIAC CARE AT AN 
EARLIER TIME. 
A BY "ADVANCED CARDIAC CARE," DO YOU MEAN-
PARAMEDICS? 
0 PARAMEDICS OR EMERGENCY ROOM. IS THAT ADVANCED? 
APPENDIX C 
54 
MAYBE I MISSPOKE MYSELF. ADVANCED CARDIAC OR ADVANCED 
LIFE SUPPORT IS WHAT I'M WANTING. 
A OKAY. I THINK HIS CHANCE FOR SURVIVAL WAS VERY 
LOW. I CAN'T SAY BECAUSE I DON'T KNOW THE DIAGNOSIS AS 
TO THE ACTUAL CAUSE OF HIS COLLAPSE. I DON'T KNOW THAT 
GETTING ON AN ADVANCED CARDIAC LIFE SUPPORT OR ADVANCED 
MEDICAL CARE SOONER WOULD OR WOULD NOT HAVE MADE A 
DIFFERENCE IN HIM BECAUSE I DON'T KNOW THE DIAGNOSIS, BUT 
I --
Q OKAY. LET ME STOP YOU RIGHT THERE. IN YOUR 
MIND IS THAT A FACTOR THAT HAS TO BE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT? 
THAT WAS THE PRIMARY EVENT AND DID IT HAVE AN INFLUENCE 
ON WHAT ULTIMATELY HAPPENED? ISN'T THAT TRUE? 
A THAT PIECE OF INFORMATION IS NECESSARY IN BEING 
MORE CERTAIN ABOUT HIS PROBABILITIES OF SURVIVAL. THE 
WAY WE WOULD THEN ESTIMATE PROBABILITY OF SURVIVAL IN THE 
ABSENCE OF THAT INFORMATION WOULD BE TO USE THE 
INFORMATION THAT WE DO HAVE. 
Q OKAY. 
A AND THE INFORMATION WHICH WE DO HAVE IS THAT HE 
DID NOT HAVE VENTRICULAR FIBRILLATION. HE HAD SOME OTHER 
EVENT. 
INDIVIDUALS WHO COLLAPSE FROM SOME OTHER EVENT 
DIFFERENT FROM VENTRICULAR FIBRILLATION AND SUMMONS 
PARAMEDICS HAVE A DISMAL PROGNOSIS. HE HAD TWO PROBLEMS 
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WHEN THE PARAMEDICS GOT THERE. HE HAD SEVERE BRADYCARDIA 
1 OR SLOW HEARTBEAT, OR WHAT THEY CALL "ASYSTOLE," WHICH IS 
| A VERY SLOW HEARTBEAT. INDIVIDUALS WITH THAT KIND OF 
PROBLEM HAVE A VERY POOR PROGNOSIS. WHEN HE DID HAVE 
HEARTBEATS, HE DIDN'T HAVE ANY PULSE. 
1 Q 
A 
WHAT DOES THAT MEAN? 
HE DIDN'T HAVE ANY PALPABLE PULSE. THAT MEANS 
THERE WAS ELECTRICAL ACTIVITY OF THE HEART. THAT MEANS 
YOU PUT 
IT WASN 
i BEATING 
AN EKG ON THE HEART, THE HEART WAS BEATING, BUT 
»T BEATING WITH ANY FORCE. IT WAS ELECTRICALLY 
WITHOUT MECHANICALLY DOING ANY PUMPING. 
SO, WHILE WE CALL THAT ELECTRICAL MECHANICAL 
DISASSOCIATION IN MEDICAL TERMS, IT MEANS THAT THE HEART 
ISN'T WORKING ALTHOUGH THE EKG SAYS IT IS. 
Q 
WHAT IS 
AND WHAT, BASED ON YOUR EXPERIENCE AND READING, 
THE CHANCES OF SURVIVAL OF A PERSON WITH 
MECHANICAL, ELECTRICAL MECHANICAL DISASSOCIATION? 
A WELL, IN THE HOSPITAL WHERE YOU HAVE INFINITE 
RESOURCES AND THE BEST OF EVERYTHING, THE PROGNOSIS IS 
VERY, VERY POOR. PROBABLY LESS THAN 5 PERCENT OF THE 
PEOPLE < 
GO INTO 
5URVIVE ELECTRICAL MECHANICAL DISASSOCIATION. 
THERE ARE A COUPLE OF EXCEPTIONS THAT HE DOESN'T 
. THIS IS HE JUST DIDN'T GET OFF BY-PASS SURGERY 
AND A COUPLE OTHER THINGS, BUT BASICALLY THE SITUATION ' 
IS, THE CHANCE FOR SURVIVAL ON HIM, WELL, UNDER 5 PERCENT. 
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ASSOCIATED WITH ARREST? 
A I COULD SAY THAT VIRTUALLY EVERY CARDIAC ARREST 
I WORKED ON WHERE THE PATIENT IS NOT IMMEDIATELY INTUBATED 
-- THAT IS A TUBE PLACED IN THE TRACHEA -- HAS SOME 
DEGREE OF ASPIRATION, VIRTUALLY ALWAYS SOME STOMACH 
CONTENTS END UP IN THE TRACHEA AND LUNGS. SO, IT'S VERY 
COMMON. 
Q WHAT YOU JUST MENTIONED, IN BACKING UP TO WHAT 
OFFICER HODGKINSON OBSERVED, WHAT YOU CALL CLINICALLY 
INSIGNIFICANT, DID THAT CLINICALLY INSIGNIFICANT 
CIRCUMSTANCE OF ASPIRATION, DID IT CAUSE, IN YOUR OPINION, 
THE EVENTUAL DEATH AND DEMISE OF MR. NEWSOM? 
A I THINK IN TERMS OF MEDICAL PROBABILITY IT IS 
UNLIKELY IT CAUSED HIS DEATH. 
Q IF WE BACK UP JUST A MINUTE AND WE TAKE THE 
FACT CIRCUMSTANCES THAT HAVE BEEN ELICITED BY PLAINTIFF'S 
COUNSEL IN THIS CASE, I WILL USE THAT AS LEAD-IN LANGUAGE 
TO ANOTHER QUESTION. IF IN FACT MR. NEWSOM -- AN AMBULANCE 
ARRIVED AT THE SCENE AT THREE MINUTES AFTER if: 0 0 AND HAD 
DONE SOME WORKUP ON HIM TO FIND OUT WHAT THE SITUATION 
WAS AND HYPOTHETICALLY DETERMINED THAT THIS WAS A CANDIDATE 
TO BE TRANSPORTED SOMEWHERE, CHECKED WITH PARAMEDICS OR 
WHATEVER, AND AS MR. RAY SAID, SPENT THREE TO FIVE MINUTES 
IN DETERMINING THAT AND LOADING THAT MAN, EIGHT MINUTES 
LOADING THIS MAN, SIX MINUTES TO THE HOSPITAL, TIME INTO 
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A 
Q 
SEE AS 
BETWEEN 
A 
Q 
THAT DR 
A 
THAT'S 
Q 
A 
YES. 
IS THIS 
FAR AS DR. 
ANALYSIS ALSO SUPPORTED BY 
MCCAA'S STATEMENTS ON THE 
HIM AND PARAMEDICS? 
YES. 
WHAT WAS IT ON THERE THAT LEAD YOU 
WHAT YOU 
TRANSCRIPT 
TO BELIEVE 
. MCCAA ALSO KNEW THE SITUATION WAS BLEAK? 
WELL, HE 
A SHAME. 
AT WHAT 
AFTER HE 
SAID, MY, THAT'S A SHAME; 
POINT IN THE SEQUENCE? 
FOUND OUT THAT HE HAD EKG 
QRS COMPLEX -- CARDIAC ACTIVITY ON EKG, BUT 
PULSE, 
OR, OH, 
BLIPS OR 
NO PALPABLE 
THIS ELECTRICAL MECHANICAL DISASSOCIATION, ONCE 
HE DISCOVERED THE 
OUTLOOK 
Q 
WAS GRAVE. 
JUST SO 
ASK THAT IN A FORM 
OF THE 
HAD MR. 
PARAMEDICS 
PATIENT HAD THAT HE KNEW THAT HIS 
I COVERED MY BASES, DOCTOR 
THAT IS PROPER. 
NEWSOM ARRESTED AS HE DID 
, I NEED TO 
AT THE TIME 
IN THE EMERGENCY ROOM, WOULD YOU HAVE 
EXPECTED A DIFFERENT RESULT THAN WHAT HAPPENED IN THIS 
CASE? 
A 
Q 
ASK THAT QUESTION AGAIN? 
OKAY. IF MR. NEWSOM HAD ARRESTED, 
RESPIRATORY ARREST 
CARDIAC ARREST IN 
GONE INTO 
, VOMITED, ASPIRATED AND WENT INTO 
THE EMERGENCY ROOM, BASED ON THE 
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INFORMATION THAT YOU HAVE, WOULD YOU HAVE EXPECTED A 
DIFFERENT OUTCOME THAN WHAT HAPPENED? 
A NO. 
MR. HAYES: THAT'S ALL I HAVE, YOUR HONOR. 
THE COURT: BEFORE YOU CROSS, LET'S ALL STAND 
FOR A MINUTE. 
CROSS-EXAMINATION 
BY MR. MC CONKIE: 
Q DR. CLAWSON, I PRESUME YOU ARE PAID FOR YOUR 
SERVICE^? 
A I'M DR. PERRY. 
Q OH, I'M SORRY. IT IS LATE. 
DR. PERRY, YOU ARE BEING PAID FOR YOUR SERVICES? 
A MOST OF THE TIME. 
Q YOU SOUND LIKE A LAWYER. HOW MUCH ARE YOU PAID 
AN HOUR? 
A DEPENDS ON WHAT I'M DOING. 
Q FOR THE WORK YOU HAVE DONE HERE TODAY. 
A I HAVEN'T DECIDED. 
Q HAVE YOU EVER TESTIFIED FOR MR. HAYES BEFORE? 
A NOT IN COURT. 
Q AND YOU HAVEN'T DECIDED WHAT YOUR HOURLY RATE 
WILL BE? 
A I THINK IT DEPENDS ON MY AVERAGE RATE AND THE 
AMOUNT OF SWEAT I LOSE. 
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Q WHAT DO YOU CHARGE HIM WHEN YOU'RE NOT ON THE 
STAND? 
A I DON'T ACTUALLY RECALL. IT'S IN -- PROBABLY 
AROUND $100 AN HOUR, I WOULD GUESS. 
Q AND HAVE YOU WORKED ON OTHER CASES FOR 
MR. NELSON? YOU MENTIONED -- MR. HAYES? 
A YES. 
Q YOU MENTIONED ONE. HAVE YOU WORKED ON MORE 
THAN ONE? 
A NOT FOR MR. HAYES. 
Q THERE ARE PEOPLE IN HIS LAW FIRM? 
A THERE IS ONE OTHER CASE IN HIS LAW FIRM THAT 
I DID SOME WORK ON, AS I RECALL. 
Q AND DOES HIS LAW FIRM OCCASIONALLY CONSULT YOU 
ON MEDICAL MATTERS LIKE THIS? 
A I BELIEVE I HAVE CONSULTED ON THREE CASES FOR 
THEM. 
Q OVER WHAT PERIOD OF TIME ARE WE TALKING ABOUT? 
A TWO YEARS. 
Q NOW, BY YOUR TESTIMONY I TAKE IT YOU ARE NOT 
SAYING THAT IT WOULDN'T HAVE BEEN A GOOD THING IF — 
MR. NEWSOM'S CHANCES OF SURVIVAL WOULDN'T HAVE BEEN BETTER 
IF SOMEONE HAD GOTTEN THERE AS EARLY AS POSSIBLES YOU'RE 
NOT SAYING THAT, ARE YOU? 
MR. HAYES: I DON'T UNDERSTAND THE QUESTION. 
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Q (BY MR. MC CONKIE) BY YOUR TESTIMONY YOU'RE 
NOT IMPLYING THAT HAD EMERGENCY MEDICAL HELP ARRIVED AT 
THE SCENE AT 4:04, 4:05 OR 4:02 THAT IT WOULD NOT HAVE 
BEEN HELPFUL TO HAVE IT THERE, ARE YOU? 
MR. HAYES: WELL, I'M GOING TO OBJECT TO THE 
QUESTION. THAT IS NOT A LEGALLY SUFFICIENT QUESTION. 
WHAT IS -- I MEAN, WE HAVE AN EMT ON THE SCENE AND HE'S 
ASKING HIM WHETHER IT WILL BE HELPFUL FOR WHATEVER. I 
DON'T THINK THAT'S THE REASON I PUT THIS DOCTOR ON THE 
STAND. 
THE COURT: WELL, THE OBJECTION IS OVERRULED. 
HE CAN ANSWER IF HE KNOWS. 
MR. MC CONKIE: THANK YOU, YOUR HONOR. 
THE WITNESS: I PERCEIVE THAT THERE ARE TWO 
DIFFERENT ANSWERS TO THE QUESTION. 
Q (BY MR. MC CONKIE) OKAY. 
A ONE IS BASED UPON MY WORKING DIAGNOSIS THAT THE 
PATIENT HAD PROBABLY A STROKE, AND IF HE DID INDEED HAVE 
A STROKE, AS I THINK HE DID, CEREBRAL HEMORRHAGE OR 
SIMILAR TYPE OF STROKE, THEN HE COULD HAVE ACTUALLY 
COLLAPSED IN THE HOSPITAL AND WOULD NOT HAVE HAD ANY 
BETTER PROGNOSIS. 
Q ISN'T IT TRUE THAT THERE ARE DIFFERENT TYPES 
AND KINDS OF STROKES, SOME OF WHICH ARE FATAL AND OTHERS 
A THAT'S CORRECT. 
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THE PATIENT THAT DIES. THEREFORE, WE SEE PATIENTS 
ROUTINELY EVEN AFTER THE HEART STOPS OUT IN THE FIELD 
WHERE THE PATIENT CONTINUES TO BREATHE EVEN AFTER THE 
HEART STOPS. IT'S ALMOST A ROUTINE THING. THE BREATHING 
DOES NOT STOP FIRST BECAUSE THAT RESPIRATORY CENTER IS 
SO WELL PROTECTED -- ANOXIA -- BUT EVENTUALLY IT WILL STOP, 
BUT IT ALMOST ALWAYS IS AFTER THE FACT. THAT IS A REAL 
CLUE IN THIS CASE THAT WHEN I FIRST READ IT IT INDICATED 
THAT THERE WAS PROBABLY A NEUROLOGICAL EVENT INVOLVED. 
Q IF, DOCTOR, AS YOU SAY, YOUR OPINION TO -- IS 
YOUR OPINION ON THE PRIMARY EVENT TO A DEGREE OF MEDICAL 
CERTAINTY THAT IT'S MORE PROBABLE THAN NOT THAT IT WAS A 
CEREBRAL EVENT AS OPPOSED TO SOME OTHER EVENT? 
A YES. 
Q GIVEN THAT OPINION WHAT WERE MR. NEWSOM'S 
CHANCES OF SURVIVAL UNDER ANY CIRCUMSTANCES? 
A EXTREMELY SMALL. 
Q DOCTOR, WE HEARD TESTIMONY AND I BELIEVE YOU HAVE 
BEEN PRESENT FOR SOME OF THIS TESTIMONY, BUT LET ME JUST --
I NEED TO KNOW THIS FOR THE RECORD AND ASK FOR EVERYBODY'S 
TOLERANCE JUST FOR A MINUTE. I WANT YOU TO CONSIDER THE 
FACTS THAT HAVE COME OUT IN THIS CASE. I WANT YOU TO 
CONSIDER TEN MINUTES TO 4:00 MR. NEWSOM HAD A PRfMARY 
EVENT, THAT HE WAS RENDERED TO THE FLOOR, THAT THE 911 
WAS CONTACTED AND THE GOLD CROSS AMBULANCE WAS CONTACTED 
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AT 4:00, THAT THEY WERE APPROXIMATELY THREE MINUTES AWAY 
FROM THE SCENE OF THIS INCIDENT. OFFICER RAY TESTIFIED 
UNDER THE BEST CONDITIONS IT WOULD TAKE THREE TO FIVE 
MINUTES FOR AN AMBULANCE TO ASSESS THE SITUATION AND 
DETERMINE WHERE THE PARAMEDICS WERE AND TRANSPORT 
MR. NEWSOM -- TOOK SIX MINUTES TO GET TO THE HOSPITAL AND 
TIME FROM THE HOSPITAL INTO THE EMERGENCY ROOM. THE REASON 
I TELL YOU THIS IS TO PUT YOU INTO THE EMERGENCY ROOM WHEN 
THESE EVENTS TAKE PLACE AT APPROXIMATELY 4:17 AND 
MR. NEWSOM IS DETERMINED TO HAVE A PULSE OF 100. HE IS 
NOT CYANOTIC, HIS COLOR IS NORMAL; HE APPEARS TO --
ALTHOUGH LABORED BREATHING, HE IS BREATHING WITHOUT ANY 
OBVIOUS SIGNS OF AIR OBSTRUCTION. THE AMBULANCE PEOPLE 
THAT ARRIVED ON THE SCENE FOUND NO REASON OR CAUSE TO TRY 
TO USE SUCTION OR WHATEVER UNTIL APPROXIMATELY 4:18, 4:19, 
SOMEWHERE IN THAT VICINITY. HE GOES INTO A RESPIRATORY 
ARREST, DOES VOMIT. AT THIS POINT SUCTION TAKES --
APPLIES SUCTION. THEY START TO VENTILATE THE MAN. THEY 
INTUBATE HIM. WITHIN A MINUTE HE GOES INTO CARDIAC 
ARREST. 
BASED ON THAT, ALTHOUGH BRIEF, SCENARIO, DO YOU 
HAVE AN OPINION AS TO THE LIKELIHOOD OF MR. NEWSOM'S 
SURVIVAL HAD HE BEEN IN THE EMERGENCY ROOM AS OP-POSED TO 
BEING TREATED BY PARAMEDICS AT INITIALLY THE SAME TIME? 
A GIVEN MY OPINION AS TO THE CAUSE OF THE ARREST, 
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I'D SAY ABSOLUTELY NO DIFFERENT FOR ALL INTENTS AND 
PURPOSES. 
IN MEDICAL DISPATCHING, TRAINING COURSES FOR 
PARAMEDICS, STROKE ALONG WITH SOME OTHER TYPES OF PROBLEMS 
REFERRED TO, NOT COMMONLY, BUT AS HUMPTY-DUMPTY PROBLEMS, 
NOT COMICALLY, ONCE THE EVENT OCCURS YOU'RE REALLY KIND 
OF OUT OF LUCK. EVEN IF YOU HAVE A PARTICULAR EVENT, 
SUBARACHNOID OR CEBERAL HEMORRHAGE, THAT WOULD ACTUALLY 
DEPRESS YOUR ABILITY TO BREATHE; YOU COULD DO NEURO-
SURGICAL CONVENTION AND IT WOULDN'T MAKE ANY DIFFERENCE. 
SO, THAT IS MY OWN PERSONAL OPINION BASED ON WHAT I THINK 
OCCURRED IN THE CASE. THERE WOULD BE NO DIFFERENT CARE, 
EVEN GIVEN IF THE PATIENT HAD A DIFFERENT TYPE OF A MEDICAL 
CAUSE AND ARRESTED AT THE SCENE. YOUR CHANCES OF SURVIVAL 
IN CARDIAC ARRESTS ARE MINIMAL. 
Q CAN YOU REFER TO ANY STUDIES OR ANY INFORMATION 
THAT WOULD SUPPORT THAT OPINION, THAT THERE ARE THINGS 
THAT HAVE BEEN DONE THAT WOULD BE CURRENT IN 1984 TO 
SUPPORT THAT? 
A YES. THE MEDICAL DIVISION OF THE SALT LAKE CITY 
FIRE DEPARTMENT DID A COMPARATIVE STUDY IN WHICH IT 
COMPARED CARDIAC ARREST SURVIVAL RESULTS IN 1978 WITH THE 
YEAR 1984. IF I CAN REFER TO MY COPY OF THAT. 
Q PLEASE DO. 
A CALLED 1978-84 SALT LAKE CITY CARDIAC ARREST, 
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REFERRING TO PAGE 3 IT TALKS ABOUT SURVIVAL. 
THE COURT: IS THIS GOING TO BE A DOCUMENT 
INTRODUCED INTO EVIDENCE? 
MR. HAYES: I DON'T THINK WE NEED TO, UNLESS 
MR. MC CONKIE -- I THINK THE DOCUMENT, HE CAN REFER TO 
IT AND GIVE ME THE INFORMATION IF HE WANTS TO USE IT TO 
REFRESH HIS RECOLLECTION. 
THE COURT: THAT'S WHAT HE'S USING IT FOR, TO 
REFRESH HIS RECOLLECTION? 
MR. HAYES: YES. 
THE COURT: OKAY. FINE. 
THE WITNESS: THE SURVIVAL BY INITIAL RHYTHM 
LISTS A NUMBER OF DIFFERENT CARDIAC ELECTRICAL RHYTHMS 
OR LACK THEREOF THAT RESULTS IN CARDIAC ARREST. THERE 
ARE BASICALLY FIVE OF THEM. 
Q (BY MR. HAYES) CAN YOU BRIEFLY TELL US WHAT 
THEY ARE AND GO TO WHAT YOU UNDERSTOOD TO BE THE RHYTHM 
IN THIS CASE. 
A WELL, THE VENTRICULAR FIBRILLATION IS LISTED. 
EIGHTY-SEVEN CASES, THERE WAS 13.8 SURVIVAL IN 1978. IN 
1984 THERE WAS A 7.7 PERCENT SURVIVAL. THAT IS THE BEST 
ONE OF THE BUNCH, IN ESSENCE. 
IN TERMS OF -- THEY'RE LARGE ENOUGH NUMBERS TO 
STUDY. ASYSTOLE, THAT IS THE LAST OF ANY CARDIAC --
STRAIGHT LINE ON THE EKG, THAT IS IN 1978 3.6 PERCENT 
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SURVIVAL OR ONE PATIENT SURVIVED OUT OF 28; AND IN 1984 
THERE WERE NO SURVIVORS OUT OF 13 -- OR OUT OF 33 PATIENTS, 
ZERO PERCENT. 
ELECTRICAL DISASSOCIAT ION, THERE WERE MANY 
FEWER PATIENTS BUT THE RESULTS HAD ZERO SURVIVAL IN BOTH 
CATEGORIES. THERE WERE NO CASES IN '78. 
EXTREME BRADY -- SLOW HEART RATE, THE SURVIVAL 
RATE IN 1978 WAS 10 PERCENT, 2 OUT OF 20; AND IN 1984, 
ZERO OUT OF 21 FOR ZERO PERCENT. 
IN ALL, THE OVERALL, MOST CARDIAC ARREST 
SURVIVAL IN 1984 WAS, AS I RECALL, 8 PERCENT. 
Q ARE THERE OTHER STUDIES THAT WOULD PARALLEL THIS 
PARTICULAR TIME? 
A WELL, ONE OF THE REASONS WHY WE DID THE 1984 
STUDY AND COMPARED IT TO 1978 WAS IN THE DISTRICT COUNCIL 
SOME OF THE HOSPITALS WERE REPORTING UNIVERSALLY 
UNSUCCESSFUL ATTEMPTS AT RESUSCITATING PATIENTS OUT OF 
THE HOSPITAL, AND A STUDY WAS BROUGHT TO THE DISTRICT 
COUNCIL AND PRESENTED BY L.D.S. HOSPITAL, WHICH HANDLES 
THE LARGEST NUMBER OF CARDIAC PATIENTS AND CARDIAC ARRESTS 
OF ANY OF THE HOSPITALS THAT I'M AWARE OF OVER THE YEARS. 
Q BEFORE YOU REFER TO THAT, ARE YOU FAMILIAR WITH 
A DOCTOR BY THE NAME OF DR. YANOWITZ? 
A YES. I DON'T KNOW HTM PERSONALLY, BUT I'M AWARE 
OF HIM. 
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Q DO YOU KNOW WHICH HOSPITAL HE PRACTICES OUT OF? 
A HE'S AT L.D.S. 
Q GO AHEAD AND GIVE US THE RESULTS. 
A THERE WAS A STUDY OF CASES ENTERING L.D.S. 
HOSPITAL EMERGENCY DEPARTMENT OCTOBER 1ST, 1982, 
OCTOBER 1ST, 1983, PATIENTS NO TRAUMATIC -- SUDDEN ONSET 
PRESUMED CARDIAC ETIOLOGY OR CAUSE. THE NUMBER OF CASES, 
TOTAL CASES WAS 64, AND THE DISCHARGE -- LET'S SEE. LET 
ME FIND IT -- RESULTS WERE -- FIND THE EXACT ONE -- SHOULD 
BE NOTED THE ULTIMATE SUCCESS RATE DISCHARGED TO HOME IS 
1.5 PERCENT; TOTAL RATE OF DISCHARGE WAS 5 PERCENT. SOME 
PEOPLE WENT TO EXTRA-CARE FACILITIES, BUT WITH SEVERE 
NEUROLOGICAL BRAIN DAMAGE THEY WERE VEGETABLES, IN ESSENCE. 
Q (BY MR. HAYES) DOCTOR, WE HAVE ALREADY LOOKED 
AT IN THIS CASE A DIAGRAM AND -- DR. PERRY REFERRED US 
TO THAT -- WAS A SIMILAR STUDY AND THE TESTIMONY WAS THAT 
IT CAME FROM A PITTSBURGH STUDY. ARE YOU FAMILIAR WITH 
THAT? 
A YES, I AM. 
Q THIS PITTSBURGH, IS THERE ANYTHING THAT YOU CAN 
RECALL THAT IS SIGNIFICANT ABOUT THAT PARTICULAR STUDY 
AS FAR AS COMPETENCY OR PEOPLE INVOLVED? 
A THIS PARTICULAR STUDY CAUGHT MY ATTENTION IN THE 
LITERATURE BECAUSE IT WAS PUBLISHED BY THE PITTSBURGH 
CENTER FOR EMERGENCY MEDICAL SERVICES THERE. THE DIRECTOR 
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OF THAT SYSTEM IS RON STEWART WHO IS A PRETTY FAMOUS 
PHYSICIAN IN THE WORK. HE WAS MEDICAL DIRECTOR FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY PARAMEDICS, ADVISOR FOR THE T.V. PROGRAM 
"RESCUE 5-1" OR "51." HE HAS CURRENTLY JUST RECENTLY 
LEFT THERE TO GO TO CANADA TO, AS I UNDERSTAND, TO BECOME 
THE HEAD OF THE CANADIAN EMERGENCY SYSTEM IN TORONTO. 
Q HAVE YOU ALSO HAD A CHANCE TO REVIEW THESE 
FINDINGS AND STATISTICS? 
A YES. 
Q ARE THEY CONSISTENT WITH THE INFORMATION THAT 
YOU JUST, AS FAR AS STATISTICAL INFORMATION, CONSISTENT 
WITH THE L.D.S. STUDY AND THE SALT LAKE CITY FIRE 
DEPARTMENT STUDY AS FAR AS SHOWING PROBABILITIES OF 
SURVIVAL, OUT OF HOSPITAL --
A EITHER THEY'RE VERY WELL STRUCTURED STUDIES OR 
SEEM TO REFLECT THE EXPERIENCE OF A MAJORITY OF SYSTEMS 
THAT I'M AWARE OF. 
Q THIS BOTTOM ONE HAS OTHER RHYTHMS, AND 
DR. PERRY INDICATED TO US THAT THAT WOULD BE DEMONSTRATIVE 
OF ASYSTOLE AND ELECTRICAL MECHANICAL DISASSOC I AT ION, AND 
IN THIS CASE WE HAVE AN ON-SCENE ARREST AND IT SHOWS ONE 
OUT OF ELEVEN; 9.1 PERCENT SURVIVAL DISCHARGED FROM THE 
HOSPITAL ALIVE. WOULD THAT BE CONSISTENT OR AT LEAST IN 
THE BALL PARK WITH YOUR UNDERSTANDING OF PROBABILITIES IN 
THIS CASE? 
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